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LENGTH OF CONTRACTS AND THE EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE 
OF MLB PLAYERS 
Katherine Stankiewicz and Michael Seeborg* 
Economics Department, Illinois Wesleyan University 
The goal of any professional athlete is to receive a multi-year contract that guarantees them a 
salary for multiple years. However, a concern that fans, coaches and owners all share is that 
when a player receives a multi-year contract they may have a strong incentive to shirk. Shirking 
is when a player purposely does not perform to the best of his ability and may occur when a 
player has a guaranteed salary. The goal of this paper is to determine if a Major League Baseball 
player with a multi-year contract win show any pattern of shirking throughout the contract. Each 
of the fifty players has a four year contract and the theories of moral hazard and asymmetric 
information suggest that a player may shirk during the contract until the last year. Descriptive 
statistics and OLS regression results provide evidence that Major League Baseball players with 
four year contracts do not have a pattern of shirking. Job security, above market wages and 
monitoring may be the important concepts explaining why there is no evidence for shirking. 
